« September 2007 | Main | November 2007 »

October 30, 2007

Ashley Gilbertson's Whiskey Tango Foxtrot - Gonzo 'Tog Iraq

We returned to the hotel in Erbil one evening to file pictures.  I flicked on the television: still Fox-only.  In the green night vision made famous during the invasion, a correspondent was crouching in front of sandbags, wearing a flak jacket and a helmet.  He was supposedly on the front lines, reporting via a scratchy video phone.  He had to whisper, he said.  The enemy was so close.  We examined the screen.  Hadn't we seen that guy at dinner?  Fox's bureau was upstairs, so it was possible.  We took a closer look, and behind the sandbags Time and I could make out the distinctive architecture of our hotel.  Fox News' frontline correspondent was reporting from his hotel room with his lights turned out. [1, p. 12]

Way post-Pynchon, Ashley Gilbertson's Whisky Tango Foxtrot: A Photographer's Chronicle of the Iraq War conveys throughout the oddness of the catastrophe, starting with the claim that he had not meant to photograph war while following the saga of the refugees it made, a pursuit that came to include the story of the Kurds, which coverage then led to being around for Peshmerga engagements with the terrorist group Ansar al-Islam. 

"Word spread to the press that I was seeing a lot of fighting," Gilbertson writes.

Talk about not guarding one's reputation . . . .

The first photograph in the tapestry that will become a beer swillin', fear instillin', in-country independent alternating with the in-the-army embedded tour into blood-spattered manhood: two Arabs, accompanied by geese, playing at billiards on a table set out on the enshadowed fringe of a mountain wheat field.

Odd.

The next shot, however, has the more familiar look: "a Kurdish fighter, or Peshmerga, stands guard on the front line near Halabja, facing Ansar al-Islam, a radical Kurdish group connected with al-Qaeda."  That fighter in baggy khaki and camouflage, Kalashnikov swung muzzle down over his shoulder, his feet planted before a berm of rock and sandbags, his head turned toward thousands of acres of open range, looks the lonely part and place.

Still, just two pages on, there's the boy in olive serge smiling and pointing a gun, a toy, at the author.

Odd.

There's even a tender moment, sort of, as "Officers from the First Armored Division perform a traditional pileup after one of their peers is promoted to Captain."  Equivalent to the football player's collegial pat on the ass for a pass well received, the scene reminds the author of the "human pyramid photographs" out of Abu Ghraib.

Odd.

Not the least bit odd though: the storyline.

Ashley Gilbertson goes to war a young man, taking chances, knocks back a beer (plural) here and there in familiar gonzo journalist fashion, and comes out of it somewhat disturbed as well as much wiser about what I like to call the inexorable workings of things, including, perhaps, his own madness with the experience, about which he writes with a healthy dose of post-traumatic angst: "I wasn't interested in discussing anything except Iraq, but if anyone who hadn't been there wanted to talk about it, I wouldn't give them the time of day.  They didn't know jack shit about the place.  No one did unless they'd been there."

As far as I've come to be concerned, the engines in the Islamic Small Wars, and I would include the internecine violence in Iraq among them, derive their energy from deeply felt personal assessments--not religious belief--about the character of self and social place in each of the afflicted societies.  If instead the violence were truly about cast, class, or faith, the battles would form up categorically, visibly, and with the unalloyed cruelty of conventional confrontations; instead, the evil sends out shoots beneath the surface of cultures and amounts, most often, to the sporadic expressions of suicide bombers and men hunting prey or looking for a fight with what is not or seems no longer themselves.

Perhaps without intending so, Gilbertson's panoramic experience of the Iraqi frontier, from Arabs playing billiards at a table set beside a wheat field to the liberation to a gaggle of Polish peacekeepers--four women wearing tank tops and sitting in lawn chairs behind the walls of a camp on the outskirts of Karbala--as the shadow of the helicopter in which the author rides passes over them to thousands of Shia faithful bowed in prayer and filling a street, as far as the camera sees, in Sadr City to, and this perhaps the signature of the experience overall, an image of a prisoner sitting on a stone floor, his head covered with a black cloth or shirt and his nose practically touching his knee while the shadow of a Marine guard with his gun held muzzle down plays on the wall behind him, the oddest thing about the war is the relative normality of a circumstance that encounters a certain but altogether sporadic violence, and then the odd invisibility, even inscrutability, of key combatants whose knowledge of identities--of themselves as well as their appointed enemy--seems scant.

Again, odd.

Spend a day inside the pages of Whisky Tango Foxtrot, and you will have spent any given day inside the War in Iraq, from before the invasion to just about now.

# # #

1. Gilbertson, Ashley.  Whisky Tango Foxtrot: A Photographer's Chronicle of the Iraq War.  Introduction by Dexter Filkins.  Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007.


Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim


--->State Paradigm : Turks to End Guerilla Challenge

  • From Gaza, Hamas pesters Israel with rockets;
  • in the West Bank, youthful Palestinians get their Irish up, so to speak, to rat-a-tat at Israeli Defense Forces troops--they suffer the consequences too;
  • from Lebanon, Hezbollah plots its next round with the Jewish state, calling its defeat in last year's incursion a victory by virtue of having survived to fight another day;
  • in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia, the blasts of suicide bombers threaten to become as common as the sound of sirens in Queens if they are not so already while each of the states remain both consistent and persistent in their efforts to stop them;
  • and from northern Iraq or Iraqi Kurdistan, finally, the once-socialist 1970's cabal that became the PKK continues to launch "actions" to draw attention to the cause of the Turkish Kurds, who are otherwise suffering deeply from the peace and prosperity that has crept into Iraqi Kurdistan and undermined regional desparation with commerce, jobs, and, at least in the Iraqi portion, education and health services.

While Iraqi and U.S. officials do a little (face-saving) dance around the meaning of a Turkish Army assault on the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan, recognized states, in general, have become more bold in their swipes at challengers. 

Turkey's contemplation of an enlarged boots-on-the-ground battlespace in Iraqi Kurdistan fits and supports that concerted state of affairs in the now multinational war on terror, and it may be making the apprehension or destruction of listed PKK members, a force of about 3000, a certainty, which would be a second "total victory" against a revolutionary band within the year: I would call Lebanon's defeat of Fatah al-Islam at Nahr al-Bared a first.

In addition to the economic and political turnaround in Iraqi Kurdistan brought about through the U.S. invasion of Iraq, other characteristics of warfare against guerrilla organizations may have increased the difficulty of the PKK's position:

  • air strikes against minimally observed sanctuary--e.g., as when a known fighter walks into a home that has not been observed or researched previously and makes that place a target--have made the social accommodation of militants more dangerous than ever and possibly discouraged social contact with them as well as sympathy for their cause;
  • dramatic and disastrous consequences for local populations attending a losing cause as at Nahr al-Bared this past year may also affect the local embrace of what may once have been the popular freedom fighter, several hundred of which lost their lives in battle with Lebanese Defense Forces while some 31,000 Palestinians fled their homes and a large percentage of those lost them permanently.
  • Indefinite qualities in rebel agendas as time, battle, and internal politics take their toll on leadership personnel and their specific guidance: this may be especially true of the PKK and its decades-long cultivation of an outlaw mistique whose romance has outlived various of its cultural, military, and political theses.

It is my understanding that in Iraqi Kurdistan, the U.S. invasion of Iraq has been called, "The Liberation," English has been made the state's second language, and except when some hot head from the south slips up the road with a bomb, the state has enjoyed respite from military operatons up to this latest debacle with Turkey.

For the Turks, of course, long the targets of PKK violence, the moment has become ripe for going after the guerrillas, who may be seen as having lost much of their former relevance along with popular sympathy.

For other guerrilla bands, there may be "signal" in the model provided by the defeat at Nahr al-Bared and developing now on the northern Iraq border: available spheres of influence may be reduced--adjust dreams and plans accordingly.

# # #

1. Popp, Maximillian.  "'Allah Wants This War'".  Spiegel Online International.  October 23, 2007.

2. Ross-Thomas, Emma.  "Turk helicopters pound Kurd rebels, PM determine."  Reuters, October 29, 2007.

3. Gottschlich, Jurgen.  "What Does the PKK Want?"  Spiegel Online International, October 24, 2007.


Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim


October 26, 2007

Turkey's PKK Hot List

One may wish the PKK membership list, whatever its authenticity or age, did not exist in that it pushes the rank-and-file within the guerrilla band away from desertion and into a less equivocal stand-or-surrender position.

Given the nature of other Islamic small wars, surrender will be a late option, if that, for those known through the list by Turkish authorities.

While one might say, "good, I hope they get them all," the price disinterested parties--the non-members, if you will, in the PKK sphere of influence--will pay for having through chance geographic proximity to the organization may or may not galvanize Kurdish resistence to or resentment of the incursion.

This is tough political calculus for the United States as well as military and political scientists worldwide.  In essence, focusing on the PKK leadership and scattering the rest, a half-measure of uncertain adequacy, has been taken off the table in favor of a more thorough piece of work but one more dangerous.

As was thought during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the sooner the war ends the better; as with some plans elsewhere, even with extraordinary control over the "battlespace" as at Nahr al-Bared this year, guerrilla fighting has a way of creeping along into tomorrow and the next day and so many after that.

There's a challenge to creating retreat or alternative course for one's enemies, and it would seem often insurmountable for them to find that for themselves.  I've used the word "inexorable" once today and here wish to use it again: there seems in this way of "working problems" that suffering through the full extent of misery becomes as inevitable as it may be remarkable.

Somalia today can barely sustain a humanitarian aid mission or two for the inability of its troops, bandits, rebels, and warlords to refrain from making the same targets for mayhem and plundering; ditto, Darfur.

Cold weather will come to Iraqi Kurdistan, and both the Turkish Army and PKK rebels will suffer as it does, but the rebels, approximately 3,000, will either escape through relatives and sympathizers elsewhere, or, if sufficiently cordoned about now, they simply won't as the numbers of the force against them would seem by every measure overwhelming. 

With the regional government and most of its constituents benefiting from "peace and prosperity" in general and the Kurds dependent, healthily so, on Turkish services and trade, the Peshmerga may be in the same position as the Lebanese Army during the Israeli incursion against Hezbollah and its rocket attacks: it hasn't a way of defending its uncommitted citizens without also tangling itself in political barbed wire.

For the sake of realpolitic and the lives of so many uninvolved or far less involved Kurds, one may hope the incursion goes fast, produces much in the way of what the Turks want, and ends with a fugitive PKK contingent that may then be demoted to an INTERPOL-type security interest


1. "Turkish air force on the move."  Reuters, October 26, 2007.

2. Mesci, Evren and Selcuk Gokoluk.  "Turkey pounds rebel positions, Iraq pushes diplomacy."  Reuters, October 26, 2007.


Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim


Surrender Impossible: Darfur

This is the question: to whom, specifically whose forces, would you surrender?

In several of the conflicts I monitor (if not refer to in comment or report), including Iraq, the answers have become so clouded or confused to bring into question whether there's a political engine with political objectives practically anywhere in the warfare, or whether violence in small cultures--i.e., brigand and warrior bands--has simply not taken on a life of its own.

The notion becomes most real and painful where many in the west wish to see a packaged and recognizable evil: genocide in Darfur.

As yet a casual reader where Sudan is concerned, I guess I just don't perceive the genocide--i.e., informally, the concerted effort by a people or state to anhilate to the last man, woman, and child the members of another race, religion, or tribe.

To whom would the victims of Darfur's bloody violence surrender?

Make it a better question: to whom would the "warring" parties of various kind surrender?

The Planetary Elders may suggest surrendering to one another, one may only guess.

How sweet.

Neither the government in Khartoum, the U.N., or the United States or anyone else has demonstrated a policing omniscience and power sufficient to stall "rebel" activities.  So far, in fact, some rebels seem to have confused the planted outpost flag with an invitation for another round of mayhem.

Darfus is a horror, so much so in the inexorable working of things that it may well be that even to those who have made it so.

If you happen to be a Kalashnikov kind of guy, entertain the questions empathetically:

  1. Even if you don't want to govern or rule and find even rape and rapine getting a little old, how do you stop?  Where do you go to wind it down?  If you choose to walk away from, where do you walk away to?
  2. For the government official and private trade interest--with how many men, what arms, and stationed where for how long can you watch and defend how much de facto frontier? 

Perhaps it's possible with night vision and heat detectiving technology to effectively survey the landscape for hostile movement and deploy sufficient force to meet it, but one has yet to see that demonstrated on even the smallest scale.

There's the familiar, daytime guerrilla aspect too: frankly, a man with a pickup truck and a machine gun isn't that much different than one with a good guitar, a decent amplifier, and a gig to go to.  By day, hey, everyone understands working on a paycheck; by night, watch out!

Politicians, all, may lack for a true basis of appeal for peace among so many bands of violent men.

Where the motives are not political, the immediately available solutions may not be so either. 

In his play, The Glass Menagerie, Tennessee Williams puts in the mouth of a young man, "Tom", whose mother means to make him his sister's keeper while he is hot to get out from under the family roof, "“Man is by instinct a lover, a hunter, a fighter, and none of those instincts are given much play at the warehouse!” [3]

Well, Tom, one need not worry about life in the warehouse out there in Darfur: the lover-hunter-fighter part holds sway across the landscape, and it looks like ain't nothin' on the horizon coming to rescue it from itself.

# # #

1. McDoom, Opheera.  "Darfur displaced say peace talks doomed to failure."  Reuters, October 26, 2007.

2. "Attacks threaten Oxfam's Darfure operation."  Reuters, September 24, 2007.

3. "Tennessee Williams."  Wikiquote, as experienced October 26, 2007.


Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim


Choose Sides

[ ? ] Us

[ ? ] Them

[ ? ] Other

Armenian Genocide Bill Postponed: Unmaking a Statement

Since when (Orwell?) have politicians been, and with both objectivity and rigor, historians?

These representatives have been described by Reuters as the "leading sponsors" of the Armenian Genocide Bill, the vote on which has been postponed at their insistence.

  • Adam Schiff, 29th District, California;
  • Brad Sherman, 27th District, California;
  • Anna Eshoo, 14th District, California;
  • Frank Pallone, 6th District, New Jersey.

As a Democrat, I like these four "leading sponsors" for their other stands but have been unable to make sense of this latest, much less of the general, isolationist anti-war bandwagon that helped haul this worn piece of lobbyist-driven draft law into the national spotlight just in time to witness Turkey's overdue effort to defend its people from the sporadic violence of the PKK.

As far removed by context as by time, the Armenian Catastrophe (many synonyms may do) may have been tantamount to genocide (armies once did anhilate their enemies, and enemies could well be defined by ethnic, religious, or tribal identity), but I don't know that, and as historians continue to argue the matter (with the records made openly available to scholars by the Turkish government, no less), I don't feel qualified to assume the "moral authority" to judge the conclusions, if any, of trained and specialized Ph.D's. 

In a letter to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, the four declaimed, "We believe that a large majority of our colleagues want to support a resolution recognizing the genocide on the House floor and that they will do so, provided the timing is more favorable." [1]

On what basis other than political lemminghood will they ever do that?

In the open societies of the west, history is not written by amorphous "winners" but rather independent scholars who enjoy the intellectual freedom to delve into the horrors of the past and convey to all who may be interested, future generations included, their reading of the record. 

In fact, one may note, it is generally the most egotistical of belligerents who extoll revisionist and politically stamped histories.

Gentleman and lady, the sooner you wash your hands of this backwards, albeit Orwellian, stumping, the better.

# # #

1. Congressman Schiff's Blog.

2. Brad Sherman for Congress.

3. Anna Eshoo for Congress.

4. Frank Pallone for New Jersey.

5. "Push for Armenian Genocide Bill postponed."  Reuters, October 26, 2007.


Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim


October 25, 2007

Positively Dickensian: Joe Bageant and the Mills of the American Working Class

Anne and I met the redneck's liberal Joe Bageant while out for a stroll a month (or two) of Sundays ago in his hometown of Winchester, Virginia, an hour's pony ride from here, while he was out in his yard patching his old house and repairing to prepare for Belize on the proceeds of his demographic rant, Deer Hunting with Jesus.

0709151734b298x

He didn't know it through our chit-chat over the housing market down his way, but we were part of the aspiring liberal educated poor: advanced degrees (true: we have three M.A.'s between us) and, for the D.C. area, low salaries or none, which, partly, is how I came to settle in Hagerstown, the Cumberland Valley, AKA about one-third to one-fifth off the price of anything and everything more closely associated with life around the nation's capital (Anne sort of caught up with me, and I let her, God bless).

I was once upon a time enamored of Charles Dickens, Jonathan Kozel, and Studs Terkel (whose work I haven't read but to which I have nonetheless given a special home in my library), also, from the 1980's education, E.F. Schumacher, George McRobie, and Larry Brown, whose works I had read, enthused as I was for ecology and economics (that first M.A.: "Outdoor Recreation Resources Management", which I managed to hook into a thesis, ne, "Perceived Social Competence, Boredom, and Capacity for Self-Entertainment," which title, to those who know me, still fits).

Anne, by comparison, seems to have missed some of the social studies reading but encountered the life. 

For the past five years, right up to this weekend but not beyond, in fact, she has served as a tutor for English composition for the TRIO Program at Bowie State University--"an educational outreach program that provides opportunities for academic development, assists students in meeting basic college requirements, and helps motivate students to successfully complete their postsecondary degrees"--a program that bestowed on her benefits by sucking about $500 per month, mandatory (the price of insuring the single woman had to be a retailer's 100 percent mark-up within a contract with the state), out of her modest, at best, paycheck for health insurance, leaving the Georgetown educated writer--also top-scoring SAT wunderkind out of high school)--living hand-to-mouth in a first-floor garden apartment efficiency down the block from my old place (yes, I picked her up at the swimming pool).

Anne, sez I, here's your chance to get out of D.C. and morph into the writer (and woman) you really want to be; and Jim, sez I also, you've had a great bachelor run and here may run into (or wreck upon) the "real life" of working white folk detailed so well by Joe Bageant.

As I have said now many times to my fellow writer and love, there must be a God to have brought us together that fated, sunny, chlorinated August afternoon: after a decade of dancing with snazzy, possibly inappropriate, cowgirls three or four nights a week down at the Cancun Cantina (and going home alone, usually, as consequence), I took that hard left turn out of the life and into oh my God (what have I done); alternatively, as I have often said to the old unrelenting if occasionally dancing "gal pal"--for whom I felt I was crawling at 9 miles an hour down the proverbial dead-end street--God also has a wicked sense of humor.

So here is my cold and rainy October morning in the mountains of western Maryland, and the girlfriend's moving in ('bout time), and I, liberal friend of the educated poor, am hunkered down shoulder-to-shoulder, as it were, with Joe Bageant, educated liberal friend of the high school educated po' white workin' class.

Remember, as if a father to children and if I teach you nothing else: God has a wicked sense of humor.

Wherefore these accidental meetings and new arriving possibilities and responsibilities?

Bageant's social tract, endearing in its bona fide trash-talkin' down-home tone (but, not to fool you, watch out for the Faulknerian tour de force when he gets going on guns and hunting--"For fifty years Kenny has oiled his guns and walked this ground, haunted by Pap, Daddy, Uncle Nelson, haunted by our Scots-Irish and Huguenot forefathers who likewise trod here, who planted it in buckwheat and hunted its frozen stubble"), rings also too true: for the men and women on the floors in manufacturing, retailing, and the less degreed parts of services (and even then), the economics have been bitter since the Reagan Devolution, and they're getting worse.

Bageant, in a near miraculous act of secular prophecy, foretells the mortgage meltdown settling down in the bellies of the the markets like the big, soft cancerous ball it is, while at the same time, which is the meat of his book, delving into the political psychology of kith and kin who have gone wayward into unhelpful Republican politics and backward (by the millions) into the comforts of Christian fundamentalist life.

Once upon a time, from Roosevelt to Johnson at least, the Democrats stood up for the working man, concocting social security and enabling unions, but perhaps at a time when it made a difference.  Today, employers higher "temps" (not to mention "interns," the most pernicious of cost-reducing practices), churn and rotate labor at the lowest levels, or, as I think has happened with Anne--these are my thoughts, not hers--threaten to indenture its far better educated, egalitarian, and idealistic citizens (at least the ones not armed with math, science, and engineering degrees for hooking into the mixed corporate-defense conglomerate) for as meager a sum as the low-rent lifestyle allows.

Personally, I'm not ready to raise my fist and shout "Solidarity!"--there's much to dislike in those politics too--but with Bageant, one hears both the call and the prophecy, and it's not only for the beer swillin' salt o' the earth but for all for whom employer interest and loyalty followed by the benefits of health care, education, affordable housing, and certain and decent retirements have slipped from grasp.

Daddy always said, "Don't get greedy."

To whom he was speaking, I was not always sure.

For the good dose of righteous whining underlaid by hard to remove facts, click on over to www.joebageant.com.

I'll probably have to go on and read "Studs" (The Great Divide) now (just as soon as I finish saving Somalia--truly, also on deck: Catherine Besteman's Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy of Slavery), but I have yet a few colorful and incendiary pages of Bageant's work through which to plow, and I'm going to enjoy them.

# # #

1. Bageant, Joseph L.  Deer Hunting with Jesus.  New York: Crown Publishers (Random House), 2007.


Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim


October 24, 2007

Gettleman's "Rebels With a Cause" -- Ogaden National Liberation Front

The signature moment in Jeffrey Gettleman's "Rebels with a Cause" for this viewer: gunmen coming out of the bush to link up with the rebels with hugs and good cheer all around.

Family.

Although backed by Eritrea, the rebels insist their struggle is not Islamic but rather one involving proprietorship and governance of the Ogaden.

A brief look at the map sets off the (again, romantic) scale of the ambition, but one need not doubt that the Somalis involved receive little to nothing in the way of services from their own embattled transitional government, and that they are also subject to the target practice, among other depradations, of Ethiopean forces in the field, the cultural and political causes of which may wind into the usual oblique game of "hot potato"--i.e., passing around blame, pointing the finger, calling someone else the bad guy.

Given the rebel's complaints regarding lack of education and medical services, one may suppose the protection of firm, benevolent government, which may well turn out their own, would seem a large part of any solution to settling what looks to me a traditional warrior band.

# # #

1. Gettleman, Jeffrey.  "Rebels With a Cause." Video.  New York Times, viewed October 24, 2007.


Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim


October 23, 2007

PKK and the Familiar Model

"I assured the minister that the Iraqi government will actively help Turkey to overcome this menace. We agreed that the position we should take is a common one to fight terrorism. We will not allow any party, including the PKK, to poison our bilateral relations." [1]

The speaker: Iraq's Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari.

However unpleasant the announcement to Kurdish readers, it fits with the Conspiracy Against the Romantic that has characterized battles at places as different as Lal Masjid in Pakistan and Nahr al-Bared in Lebanon.

The militant's whose causes have been so deeply woven into their heads as to defy translation into immediate, realistic, and achievable political objectives, find themselves inevitably cordoned by far larger powers.

The principle of the romantic: the good gesture.

Across the Islamic Small Wars, the beau geste signals authentic dedication to the cause.

The issues that have energized the PKK differ quite from those that have turned "Islamists" into self-immolating smart bombs elsewhere: for the PKK, communal sharing (or whatever remnant ideas have survived its socialist start), preservation of culture, and the consolidation of Kurdish culture into a single national entity (rather than scattered across four state boundaries) serve for cause.

Unforutunately, for the PKK, the mechanics that pit contemporary guerrilla warriors against determined state forces would seem to care not for cause: the world and time swirl on around these fixed brave last stands.

In my opinion, of course, until they stand, the less notorious of PKK members may well recede into Iraqi Kurdistan's security force and then serve under the control and at the pleasure of the still new minted regional government.  Who is to know?  How?  But those who are better known may face a frightful prospect under arrest or battle with Turkish forces or otherwise fugitive from the people and land closest to their hearts.

The NATO allies have at stake the preservation of their established security arrangement, which here would seem to pit young democracies and "meritocracies" against the feudal ties that would comprise the alternative organizing system.

Where the students at Lal Masjid thought Pakistanis would rise up behind them, or, lord only knows, the army would turn against Musharraf and in their favor, or that their martyrdom would turn the country toward an Islamic Revolution akin to that in Iran, nothing of the kind happened.

Similarly, the colonizing Fatah al-Islam at Nahr al-Bared, intending to save the Palestinians, destroy Israel, and reconfigure the Middle East similarly failed to lead latent and imagined legions into battle against the Lebanese Defense Forces.

This too with the PKK has that structure.  If the PKK turns an army or creates a widespread "people's war", it will break a pattern established elsewhere.

The two most glaring failures of guerrilla forces anywhere: 1) failure to become without question an overwhelmingly popular cause; 2) failure to at some point stand and survive as a conventional force.

For the most part, and most troubling, "success" where contemporary guerrillas operate has come to mean sustained political chaos and senseless (random) death and economic misery for noncombatants unlucky enough to have found themselves sharing the same relative geography.

# # #


1. "Iraq says to help Turkey crack down on Kurd rebels."  Reuters Alert Net, October 23, 2007.


Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim


October 22, 2007

Isolated, Feudal - Sudan, Somalia

The old feudal systems isolated themselves: hilltop, castle, moat, greenbelt, forest.

The contemporary ones seem to have found themselves so by fate: mountains, deserts, and oceans serve for boundaries.

The old lords, their families, and servants gauged their power locally and regionally and earned or lost it through courage and sword; the latest in warlords feature the same, but in place of swords, small arms that are no longer so small: assault weapons, mounted machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, armor-piercing mines, mortar.

For the most part, western politicians and news media have, in a sense, taught the Islamic Small Wars as revolving around religious fundamentalism in Islam, but this other facet, the overarching feudal structure of the fighting, seems to me both inescapable and equally overlooked.

Perhaps for the reader who needs a clear bogeyman, the "Islamists" will do even as it becomes a catch-all.

For the rest of the world, curiosity asks, "who" as the last isolating guards--rugged geography and paper-based communications--lose relevance. 

"The government denies arming militias and tribal factions in Darfur, although it has raided camps in the past in search of rebel strongholds." [1]

"Who?" has been the question for years in Sudan: who commands the government's troops?  Who are the rebels?  What tribes are involved and who from them is fighting (by affiliation x family relationship x social position defined otherwise).

In Somalia, similarly, the pirates are well armed: speedboats, machine guns, cell phones, GPS.  On the fate of a missing cargo ship, the Al Marjon, the head of the East African Seafarer's Assistance program noted, "We are trying to find its position and who are the gunmen." [2]

Who are the gunmen?

Piracy, which in Somalia generally refers as well to kidnapping by sea, is criminal, and, of course, the criminals wish never to be known.  However, the proceeds, climbing into the tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars per ship, must makes its way into the economy (and if those getting their share of the business know what's good for them, they'll keep their mouths shut).

Somalia has probably never been by nature a "proto-democratic", socialist, or colonial society: it has been clan-based and feudal.  Where the Vikings familiar to "the west" happily plundered the French and English coasts, among others, the Somali pirates seem to be doing much the same with international shipping that happens by its maw.

What makes so much acquiesence to criminal behavior possible? 

A little nerve and a lot of isolation.

What organizes the violence?

Family.

# # #

1. Heavens, Andrew.  "Three soldiers killed in Darfur camp attack - UN".  Reuters Alert Net, October 22, 2007.

2. "Missing ships feared seized by pirates off Somalia."  Reuters Alert Net, October 22, 2007.


Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim