Oppenheim Arts & Letters

Afghani Reality

The route from Kabul to Kandahar had earned a reputation as the "road of death" according to a reporter's coverage today in Digital Chosunibo [1], the web site of a top Korean newspaper, circulation 2.38 million [2].  That the observation comes through a Korean outlet may speak volumes about the need to remind idealists, if not common business travelers, that a U.S. presence or the presence elsewhere of appropriate and recognized government forces may not transform a persistent war zone into a merely unruly region.

Last week's kidnapping in Afghanistan of 23 South Korean nationals of the Saemmul Church of Bundang [5], an affluent district in the south-central portion of the county,  has so far resulted in the death of the group's leader, the Reverend Bae Hyung-Kyu.

A Taliban-imposed July 26 deadline of 1:30 a.m. has passed without news of actions taken, if any, making its way on to the Internet for my perusal.

One observation that may be worth making in looking over this and similar events is how ordered they are once they're in motion: buildup --> insurgent action --> government response --> negotiation --> resolution generally by arms --> next action.  Each story, from Nahr al-Bared to lal Masjid to this  episode involving Korean nationals, cycles down into its own relatively closed loop.

# # #

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1. "Understanding Reality in Afghanistan."  Digital Chosunilbo, July 26, 2007, 7:48 KST.

2. "Top Newspaper with a daily circulation of 2,380,000 copies."  Chosun.com.

3. "Taliban kill South Korean hostage."  Sydney Morning Herald, July 26, 2007 10:51 a.m.

4. Masood, Ahmad.  "Taliban kill South Korean hostage in Afghanistan."  Reuters, July 25, 2007, 9:03 p.m. EDT.

5. Salahuddin, Sayed.  "Afghan Taliban extend deadline for Korean hostages."  Reuters, July 23, 2007, 19:51 GMT.

6. "Korean Hostage Confirmed Dead in Afghanistan." Digital Chosunilbo, July 26, 2007, 8:53 KST. 

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Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim

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Afghanistan: The Lottery

The picture comes from Chad Hunt's imbedded misson with the 10th Mountain Division, Operaton Mountain Lion, Korengal Outpost, 2006 [1].

Keep this in mind about terrorism:

• The enemy is invisible;
• The enemy may be few relative to population, but it has substantial destructive power.

Chad Hunt's picture of a soldier jogging under weight to avoid sniper fire may be indicative of Islamist efforts to slowly cull coalition forces through IED's, ambush, and sniper fire in one of the the world's last true geopolitical frontiers, which is how I'm going to think of Afghanistan's Korengal Valley, Kunar Province [2,3].

About a month and a half ago on this blog, I had composed a little bit of philosophy after seeing relatively domestic pictures of U.S. troops in Afghanistan [4]:

Is that what peace looks like?

Mountain day
Clear, quiet, prayer
Again and

Again.

Then I had thought to start work on a list of U.S. military imbedded photographers and their work [5] and doing so linked to more of Chad Hunt's work.

Chad Hunt caught the poem and wrote back, "About 20 men have died at the Korengal Outpost and since they have been replaced by the 82nd 2 months ago they have lost 10. My point is that it is a dangerous place in spite of what you see in the news."

In secular cultures, theories of relativity do not apply to murder: one wrongful death is too many.

Shirley Jackson's short story, "The Lottery" [6], became cannonized partly on the basis that evil, however sparsely distributed and for whatever cause, remains evil.  In that the story has also its religious and ritual keys, it makes an especially useful reference here.

Perhaps news makers should not so easily calculate 30 deaths across two years against the latest spectacular truck bumb that partially destroys a mosque and takes better than a hundred civilian casualties with it.

Perhaps revisiting Afghanistan's rugged terrain, and this with the Pakistani army pushing Islamic militants from its side, would seem in order, and I may follow that some after this piece.

Casualties associated with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan have been listed by icasualties.org with the number of U.S. dead totalling 331 on the page referenced.  Of Chad's 20 casualties experienced in his stay, ten may be ascribed to the crash of a Chinook helicopter on May 5, 2006:

• Private Brian M. Moquin, Jr.
• Specialist David N. Timmons, Jr.
• Specialist Justin Z. Odonohoe
• Sgt. Jeffery S. Wiekamp
• Sgt. John C. Griffith
• Sgt. Bryan A. Brewster
• Staff Sgt. Christopher T. Howick
• Chief Warrant Officer Christopher B. Donaldson
• Chief Warrant Officer Eric W. Totten
• Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Fenty

From running down the lists at militarycity.com, non-combat fatalities involving 10th Mountain Division troops in Afghanistan in 2006 included Derek A. Stanley, 20, of Tulsa, Oklahoma (June 5), First Lt. Benjamin D. Keating, 27, of Shapleigh, Maine (November 26), and Private Michael V. Bailey, 20, of Waldorf, MD (October 27).  Whether resulting from an accident at work or just being out and about in the someone else's big country (two of the deaths noted, Keating's and Bailey's, were listed by militarycity as under investigaton), conditions apart from enemy ordnance make just "being there" perilous.

"Operation Mountain Lion" kicked off with troop insertions by helicopter and incursion on foot into Kunar Province starting the night of April 11, 2006 [10}.  Here's the roll I've distilled so far of combat-related deaths stealing troops from the 10th Mountain Division in Afghanistan for the remainder of the year (source: "Faces of Valor" listings at www.militarycity.com [8]):

June 13, 2006: Sgt. Russel M. Durgin, 23, of Henniker, New Hampshire encountered small-arms fire in Korengal.

June 14, 2006: Sgt. Robert P. Pena, Jr., 29, of San Antonio, was killed by small-arms fire during combat operations in Musa Qulah.

June 16, 2006: Ian T. Sanchez, 26, of Staten Island, New York and 1st Lt. Forrest P. Ewens, 25 of Chewelah, Washington drove an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) over an improvised explosive device (IED) in the Pech River Valley.

June 21, 2006: Staff Sgt. Patrick L. Lybert, 28, of Ladysmith, Wisconsin encountered small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG's) in Gowandech.  Also killed on this date in the vicinity of Naray, Afghanistan were Pfc. Brian J. Bradbury, 22, of St. Joseph, Missouri who encountered small-arms fire and RPG's and Staff Sgt. Heathe N. Craig, 28, of Severn, Maryland who died when his UH-60 helicopter hoist malfunctioned.  In Gowardesh, Sgt. 1st Class Jared C. Monti and Staff Sgt. Patrick L. Lybert, 28, of Ladysmith, Wisconsin encountered small-arms fire and RPG's.

June 25, 2006: Pfc. Justin R. Davis, 19, of Gaithersburg, Maryland took indirect fire at Korengal.

June 28, 2006: Corporal Aaron M. Griner, 24, of Tampa, Florida was killed when his vehicle struck a mine in Helmand.

July 6, 2006: Pfc. Kevin F. Edgin, 31, of Dyersburg, Tennessee died when his convoy encountered enemy small arms fire in the Baghran Valley.

July 16, 2006: Sgt. Robert P. Kassin, 29, of Las Vegas encountered small-arms fire at Larzab Base.

July 17, 2006: Staff Sgt. Robert J. Chiomento, 34, of Fort Dix, New Jersey encountered on patrol in Khwaya Ahmad mortar and RPG fire.

July 24, 2006: Sgt. David M. Hierholzer, 27, of Lewisburg, TN, encountered small-arms fire in the Pech River Valley.

August 11, 2006: Pfc. James P. White, Jr., 19, of Huber Heights, Ohio, Pfc. Andrew R. Small, 19, of Wiscasset, Maine, and Specialist Rogelio, R. Garza, Jr., 26, of Corpus Christi, Texas all encountered small-arms fire and RPG's in Nangalam.

August 16, 2006: Corporal Jeremiah S. Cole, 26, Hiawatha, Kansas turned up an IED in Bermel.

August 17, 2006: Private Joseph R. Blake, 34, of Portland, Oregon took on small-arms fire in Turkalay.

August 19, 2006: Corporal Christopher F. Sitton, 21, Montrose, California, Specialist Robert E. Drawl, Jr., 21, of Alexandria, Virginia, and Sgt. Wakkuna A. Jackson, 21, of Jacksonville, Florida found an IED in Kunar.

September 11, 2006: Sgt. Jeremy E. DePottey, 26, of Ironwood, Wisconsin was involved in a single-vechicle accident in Asadabad (the "Faces of Valor" page does not state whether the accident was combat related or not).

October 2, 2006.  Corporal Fernando D. Robinson, 21, of Hawthorne, California encountered small-arms fire and RPG's in Korengal.

October 3, 2006: Corporal Angelo J. Vaccarro, 23, of Deltona, Florida died of injuries sustained during combat operations in Korengal.

October 13, 2006: Specialist Jason A. Lucas, 24, of Columbus, Ohio drew a suicide bomber using a "vehicle born improvised explosive device" in Kandahar.

October 31, 2006: Major Douglas E. Sloan, 40, of Evans Mills, New York, Sgt. Charles J. McClain, 26, of Ft. Riley, Kansas, and Pfc. Alex Ocegeura, 19, of San Bernardino, California were fatally injured by an IED in the Wygal Valley.

May all rest in peace.

The Army-Times published database includes all of the War on Terror's theaters and the rolls from all military units participating, but even reduced to the concerns of one army division in one country for little more than half a year, the list grew steadily, month by month, soldier by soldier.

Attrition, especially in the defender's camp, is never rewarding.  There's nothing to be gotten from it, and it becomes a manner of combat endured at least until the flow of enemy ordnance and personnel has been choked down to a near decisive end.

Also, when we see relatively placid pictures of guys getting haircuts, small patrols walking around ruins, meetings between military personnel and community elders or other leaders in Afghanistan, it's easy to play down the relentless character of brief but deadly violence: no pitched battle is needed where decision is not wanted by the guerrilla force: a sniper or suicide bomber will work just fine for attacking coalition morale.

Here is a bright, cultivated field in Kunar Province, and toward the back at the foot of the hills, the stone outbildings that support cultivation. [9]

Since Operation Mountain Lion began, every few days afterward in 2006, whether through accidents, non-combat incidents, IED's, small-arms fire, RPG's, mines, mortars, suicide bombers the front chipped away at forces, never quite allowing operations to gear down to a peace keeping mission--that thing, peace, remained an elusive goal, and it remains so to this day.

For the 82nd Airborne Division, which took over the Korengal Outpost assignment, and other units operating in Afghanistan, the small but steady carnage continues. 

This is not say enemy hasn't been taking casualties too, but that may be small comfort to any going for a short walk in the vicinity of the Hindu Kush.

# # #

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1. Hunt, Chad.  the korengal outpost (KOP).

2. "Konar" Province, Afghanistan.  Google Earth, 34-deg., 56-33 N, 71-deg., 05-43 E.

3. Kunar Province, Afghanistan, Wikipedia.

4. Oppenheim, James S. "070531-1030: Surfing Conflict".  Oppenheim Arts & Letters.

5. Oppenheim, James S.  "070601-0424: The War News, Personal".  Oppenheim Arts & Letters.

6. Jackson, Shirley.  "The Lottery". Americanliterature.com--Twenty Great American Short Stories.

7. "Operation Enduring Freedom: Coalition Deaths."  icasualties.org.

8. "Faces of Valor."  Military City.

Note: 10d/08/2018: link invalid - no substitute.

9. Afghan, Monneb.  "Eastern Afghanistan."  Photograph licensed under Creative Commons Attribution Sharealike 2.0. Initial Source: "Kunar Province."  Wikipedia.

10. "Ten 10th Mountain Division Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan May 5."  Fort Drum press release.

11. Lindsay, Sgt. Joe, USMC.  "Operation Mountain Lion Roars into Korengal Valley."  American Forces Press Service, May 8, 2006.

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Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim

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Gardens, Rituals

"My straw hat low on my brow, O go down the grassy,

  vine-covered

Slope, mount the beautiful sloping stone stairs, step after step.

Already the house has vanished; I see the clipped boxwood

Tower rigid in the glowing sky, and the garden takes me,

The steep vineyard slope receives me; at once my thoughts are

Far from the house, from breakfast, books, mail and the paper."

Herman Hesse's Hours in the Garden and Other Poems (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1979, p. 11) touches on the beauty inherent in nature and in ritual, for gardens, abundant with herbs and flowers, have about them the scent of the divine, an earthy undertone, a too brief sweetness, and time in them is time spent apart and with God.

From its description, Hesse's garden comprised a mountain space of varying cultivation, decay, and tangle.  He describes, for example, the life and ruin of a cactus, once healthy, later cut and rotting from the inside, around the tomb of which his poetic character plants columbine (". . . and I hope there won't be too much / Sun for it here, because its home is the forest floor").

My garden is a 6 x 12 foot deck adorned with wind chimes surrounding hanging baskets and railing planters laden this mid-summer with Dusty Miller and Petunias.  As small as it is, Anne and I have made it spacious; as common as it may be, I have found ways of inhabiting it and, I hope, picturing it that both enliven and sooth the spirit.

Every day brings change to the garden--more blooms, more leggy stems, even more bugs, for which I spray from time to time.  Nonetheless, it's timeless too: the morning's cup of coffee and pastry; the hours spent reading in an old canvas chair; the afternoon plate of olives and feta cheese; the dusk settling down with talk over Margaritas; even late at night beneath a lantern, the clay fired cup of cold white wine.

I have heard that "living is an art," but I have found many arts are what make living beautiful, and then too taking the full measure of time to enjoy each in its turn, which time spent becomes time eternal.

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Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim

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Wild by the Roadside

Daylily

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Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim

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Retreat

Posted: 070712-0800

I've been mean to my girlfriend, neglected my business, let my guitar strings rust, and have not even stepped away to take a few minutes in my small garden for a week, the weekend included, the issues and the news have been just that riveting.

Everyman with a computer on the Internet has now in addition to entertainment 24-7-365 a near real-time front row seat to world history in the making.

Even from the desk chair, it's a consuming position: what part would anyone dare miss?

So today I have my Fair Trade Organic Ethiopian Yirgacheffe for comfort and with that start am taking the day off from the War on Reason.

After Lal Masjid

Post Start: 070711-1250H EDT; Updated:

Writing for BBC News from Islamabad, Kahn M. Ilyas posts the two paragraphs that should be and will be read around the world:

On the domestic front, his move against the militants appears to have the support of Pakistan's largest political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which recently frustrated efforts by the opposition groups to form a united front against him.

Troop movements in the sensitive north-western parts of the country during the last four days indicate that the government is willing to take the Red Mosque campaign to the doorstep of the militants. [1]

One cannot image the Palestinians encamped at Nahr al-Bared nor the upwards of 5 million Iraqi refugees cheering on those who have brought the roofs crashing down on their heads or with cruelty and self-righteous menace intimidated, threatened, and murdered them.

This morning, in informal violation of a pact it has kept for 38 years, the Lebanese Army has positioned to assault Nahr al-Bared [2].

Quite independent from President Musharraf's government in Pakistan, the Lebanese government has reached similar conclusions about its version of an Al Qaeda-like invasion force: it will not tolerate the provision of sanctuary to those who defy the will of God in the citizens of the state at large.

The western or contemporary "open society" view of Islam is that the fundamentalist movement within it represents but a fraction of its worldwide population, but as this site has made clear, conservatism, at least, in Islam is far more the rule than exception.

Still, we should all be so good.

Without question, the vast majority of Islam seems to prefer peace to war--not one Islamic army, and there are many, has focused its attention against the west: those prosecuting the war have been doing so at the guerrilla level; those defending with popular support have all been state-based organizations drawing their recruitments directly from their constituencies.

In one country only has a fundamentalist Islamic movement experienced substantial success: Somalia. In that country, the Islamic Courts Council administration of the southern portion could have become a permanent establishment, but as the nature of the fundamentalist firebrand is to look toward the next challenge, the same government in power, collecting taxes and running courts of a sort, prodded Ethiopia with its spear and thereby reduced itself back to lobbing grenades in the odd market place and movie house, effectively returning the beleaguered citizens of Somalia to anarchy and mayhem and the loss of life through violence at a steady weekly clip.

It's a hackneyed thought in the anals of guerrilla warfare study that the "guerrilla needs only to survive to win his war; the state cannot win unless it eliminates the guerrilla."

The assault on Lal Masjid and its aftermath make clear just how difficult it is for the state to both watch and then defend itself and secure with finality a single small urban location.  Robert Birsel's piece in Reuters on the "mopping up" at Lal Masjil makes that much clear:

Three militants were killed overnight and several militants and soldiers were wounded in a morning clash. A wounded man was found in a basement bathroom in the evening, Arshad said.

Occasional explosions rang out from the fortified mosque-school complex as troops destroyed booby-traps and mines. [3]

Creating countermeasures for guerrilla warfare has been, I believe, largely a state internal security matter--something for the CIA, FBI, KGB and every other secrets-penetrating, state-run intelligence operation.  The idea there: guerrilla operations rely on logistical and personal networks and relationships to launch and sustain operations, and the state-based organizations work to map such networks and dismantle them.

However, I am starting to wonder whether the field isn't the thing, after all.

Positioning and hiding small state-sponsored units may start to address the invisibility issue common to all guerrilla units.

How Presidents Abbas, Karzai, Lahoud, Musharraf, Talabani and Yusuf, every one of them a Muslim, and their people have come to similar conclusions about people who leave bombs in cars, also kidnap police, murder foreign nationals, threaten their neighbors, blow up mosques, and brutalize the population at large may turn out a part of the history of current events overlooked.

The end at Lal Masjid: beyond the dead and injured and the shattered survivors of the event, widespread home and international military and political sympathy and support for President Musharraf.

# # #

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1. Kahn, M. Ilyas.  "Siege consequences for Musharraf."  BBC News, Islamabad, July 11, 2007, 11:41 GMT.

2. Saddiq, Nazih.  "Palestinians flee as Lebanon army set to storm camp." Reuters, July 11, 2007, 8:03 a.m. EDT.

3. Birsel, Robert.  "Pakistani forces secure mosque complex."  Reuters, July 11, 2007, 11:05 a.m. EDT.

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Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim

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The Missing Children of Lal Masjid

Post Section Start: 070711-1045 Updated:

"It opera ain't over 'til the fat lady sings," and the fat lady had a long wait at Lal Masjid.

Witte, Griffe.  "Two-Day Battle at Islamabad Mosque Ends."  The Washington Post, July 11, 2007, 10:05 a.m. EDT.

I'm sorry to have reported the end before its time, even if by hours.

The more time the militants had in negotiations, the more time they had to lay plans, to position, and to rig land mines and other ordnance for the commandos who would sweep them from the mosque.

Post Secton Start: 070710-0945 Updated: 070710-0950H EDT; 6:60 p.m. Islamabad.

It's not necessarily the story that changes by the hour but the search for language to represent it.

Here's the lead from Zeeshan Haider's piece for Reuters, "Pakistani troops storm mosque", last posted at 8:40 a.m. EDT:

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Pakistani forces stormed a mosque compound on Tuesday, killing about 50 militants, as they fought their way through an Islamic school where they believed a rebel cleric was hiding with women and children hostages. [3]

In the minds of one or two writers--Kamran Haider earlier this morning, Zeeshan Haider now--"yet to encounter" has morphed into "fought their way through."  However subtle, just that small difference has the power to influence opinion around the world.

The cooler heads that must prevail wait, however, for the story to end and the facts to settle.

For the time being, Zeeshan Haider's piece reports 30 children and 24 women escaped from the fighting and secure and quotes Major-General Waheed Arshad, the military's spokesman, as saying, "Six of the children said they had been kept in the basement of the mosque but fled when their guards disappeared after commandos overran it." [3]

Post Section Start: 070710-0415 Updated: 070710-0500H EDT

Whatever Lal Masjid, the "Red Mosque", was as a noun representing an event, it's over.  For Reuters, Kamran Haider reports, " . . . commandos had yet to encounter any women and children, with more than two-thirds of the complex cleared." [1]

Earlier in the bulk of the action that took place between 4 a.m. and about noon in Islamabad, journalists reported commandos finding 20 children on the main floor of the mosque and ushering them to safety.

Griffe Witte's piece in The Washington Post reports the following:

By 9 a.m., at least three commandos had been killed and 15 members of the security forces had been wounded, according to a military spokesman, Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad. Forty radicals in the compound had been killed and scores more were wounded or captured, Arshad said. A source at a hospital that was treating civilians said the staff was handling dozens of casualties, some of them women. Security forces picked up 20 children who fled as the fighting began, while ambulances raced to and from the scene. [2]

Here's an Orwellian note: I first cited Witte's piece at 10:30 p.m. EDT.  It's now 5 a.m., EDT, and the same URL, the same piece, has been filled and smoothed into a near real-time piece of reporting.  The web may have a way to go when it comes to knowing when to "fix" or "freeze" a story as is, so we're not dealing the ye olde "memory holes."

Another partially literary observation: taking the adversarial position comes easily.

One might read into Kamran's statement ("commandos had yet to encounter any women and children, with more than two-thirds of the complex cleared') criticism of the information provided the press by the government and military, an echo to American ears of the harping over missing weapons of mass destruction early in the invasion of Iraq. 

The well worn possibilities: either the military garnered worldwide sympathy through disinformation, or the press is "out to get" the military.

There's a much less combative position: both the press and military are waiting on the rescue of women and children, if not the horror of their destruction by suicide vests.

It's early afternoon in Islamabad, and so far as I know, the verdict's still out on the missing women and children of Lal Masjid, whose numbers at minimum were supposed to have been in the hundreds.

# # #

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1. Haider, Kamran.  Pakistanis storm mosque; up to 50 dead.  Reuters, July 10, 2007, 3:11 a.m. EDT.

2. Witte, Griffe.  "Commandos Storm Mosque in Pakistan Afters Talks Founder."  Washington Post Foreign Service, The Washington Post, July 10, 2007.

3. Haider, Zeeshan.  "Pakistani troops storm mosque."  Reuters, July 10, 2007, 8:40 a.m. EDT.

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Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim

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Lal Masjid--"Red Mosque": Running Headers

Post Start: 070709-0830 Updated: 070709-0404 EDT (1:30 p.m. Islamabad)

The "Red Mosque" story is one I might follow all day and should, when it resolves in that location, for several days afterward.  Instead of commenting constantly, I'm going to use this tile to list reading or other media as I encounter it, listing most recently found material first. 

I'll also run the Islamabad clock, courtesy of worldtimeserver.com, until the crisis has been resolved at Lal Masjid.

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I've removed the analog clock that was ticking on this page for two days.  Whatever Lal Masjid, the "Red Mosque", was as a noun representing an event, it's over.

Haider, Kamran.  Pakistanis storm mosque; up to 50 dead.  Reuters, July 10, 2007, 3:11 a.m. EDT.

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It's about 10:30 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time, and, as you can see, about 7:30 a.m. in Islamabad.  Pakistan's experienced Rangers have been fighting since 4 a.m.  Despite a check of a raft of news sources here, the news comes out slowly, one becomes so accustomed to "live" and "instant" reporting from even the most harrowing scenes.

I've been refreshing my Dawn news page, and it's still reading from yesterday--it should have been reporting from the 10th for the past seven hours, not the 9th.

The majors--CNN, BBC, Reuters, The Washington Post--are up and on it, but if you ask the question, is it over after three-and-one-half hours . . . who knows?

Witte, Griffe.  "Commandos Storm Mosque in Pakistan Afters Talks Founder."  Washington Post Foreign Service, The Washington Post, July 10, 2007.

"Pakistani army moves on mosque."  Video.  CNN, July 9, 2007, about 10 p.m. EDT.

"Fighting rages at besieged mosque."  CNN, July 9, 2007, 9:45 p.m. EDT.

In the latest from The Washington Post, this excerpt:

"Commandos attacked the compound from three directions and quickly cleared the ground floor of the mosque, army spokesman Gen. Waheed Arshad said. Some 20 children who rushed toward the advancing troops were brought to safety, he said."

Khan, Zarar.  "Troops Storm Pakistan Mosque Compound."  The Washington Post, July 9, 2007, 9:23 p.m. EDT, 6:23 a.m. Islamabad.

"Pakistani troops storm mosque."  BBC News, July 10, 2007 01:18 GMT.

"Pakistani troops move on mosque."  BBC News, July 10, 2007 00:40 GMT.

Here it comes.  It's dawn in Islamabad. 

Haider, Kamaran.  "Pakistanis launch attack after Mosque talks fail."  Reuters, July 9, 8:32 p.m. EDT; 5:32 a.m., Islamabad.

""They were closing down gambling dens and shops selling compact discs with obscene content, so what was wrong in that?" The woman asking the question lost her daughter at Lal Masjid: "Pakistani mothers sees daughter's death at mosque as a blessing." Keralanext.com, July 9, 2007.

"Chinese workers shot in Pakistan."  BBC News, July 9, 2007, 6:05 GMT. Old by a day or new this evening, it looks related, so it's here--no more dilutons, though.

"Lal Masjid standoff reaches negotiating table."  IBNLive.com via Yahoo News, July 9, 2007, 11:48 p.m.  "New Delhi: The Pakistani government has decided to place Lal Masjid cleric Abdul Rashid Ghazi under house arrest," says this clip. My intent here is to search for and post what strikes me as responsible rhetoric and journalism with integrity (no rants).

"Fatwa issues against Ghazi brothers."  The WeCite Blog, July 9, 2007 2:33 a.m.  The piece has been pulled from "Pakistan Link", and first posted in the Daily Times on July 8.

Sigamony, Terence J.  "Lal Masjid operation: Relatives in the dark as to students’ whereabouts."  Daily Times, July 9, 2007.

"Eight top terrorists inside Lal Masjid."  Daily Times, July 9, 2007.

Azia, Faisal.  "No breakthrough in talks over Pakistan siege Mosque."  Reuters, July 9, 2007, 3:04 p.m. EDT.  In this article, Faisal quotes Pakistani Information Minister Mohammad Ali Durrani as saying, "Six parents who went in to bring out their children had been taken hostage."

Cameron-Moore, Simon.  "Mosque siege puts Musharraf policy under scrutiny."  Reuters, July 9, 2007, 12:26 EDT.

Khan, Ilyas.  "Tough choices for Musharraf."  BBC News, July 9, 2007.

This one dates back to July 5, 2007, but for background, I thought it pretty good to share with you: "Khan, Aamer Ahmed.  "Mosque raid boosts Musharraf's image." BBC News, July 5, 2007.

"Negotiation team reaches Lal Masjid."  Dawn, July 9, 2007, 1930 PST.

Long, Helen.  Video: "Mosque militants ignore last warning."  Reuters, July 9, 2007.

"Pakistan to negotiate over mosque." BBC News, July 9, 1213 GMT.

Aziz, Faisal.  "Gunfire but no assault seen yet at Pakistan mosque."  Reuters, July 9, 2007, 5:56 a.m. EDT.

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Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim

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Getting On With It--Red Mosque 070709-0620

Post Start: 070709-0630H EDT; Updated: 070709-0820H EDT

The military overhead photograph of Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa, the "Red Mosque", shows three or four buildings, the sparse landscaping of now mature trees, the ocher ground beyond its back walls.  [1] It is about 4 p.m. in Islamabad, so the bulk of another working day has passed, so far, without a full-scale military assault.

On Saturday, the BBC News ran a profile of the leading cleric remaining in the mosque, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who once worked for UNESCO. [2]  In that piece, Sanjay Dasgupta, the writer, quotes Ghazi as follows:

"We will not agree to any condition which makes it appear that we have made the slightest concession or that we have bowed to pressure from the government," he told the BBC.

"We would rather die than to make any such concession."

Dasgupta's piece suggests the cleric's radicalization started with the assassination of his father by an unknown gunman and then contact with Pakistani intelligence services and the Taleban, but no related introspection comes from Ghazi himself, only the defiant statement that overlooks the idea that he would rather die than surrender but not the children who were shot trying to make their way to safety.

Five days ago at the start of hostage taking, or the gathering, the BBC covered the anguish of parents in the disaster and offered this glimpse into the deeper heart of the language and perception part of the puzzle:

"My two daughters are inside and I am worried about them," said an agitated Mohammad Javed, a retired soldier from Kashmir.

"They are 14 and 10 years old. I have talked to them and they are willing to die for Islam."

He insisted that the government has put students' lives at risk.

"It is the government's fault, they should back down... They don't care about the common man." [3]

What is the true Islam?

To a western mind, Mohammad Javed's observation that his children are willing to die for Islam overlooks the fact that the government's troops are fighting for it too, and that the government, giving this as many days as it has, has been trying to save those who are not actually involved in challenging the state and its laws.

Which is the more just Islam?

We would think provoking a fight with police, firing on them with Kalashnikovs, gathering innocents together for martyrdom (whether they like it or not), and subjecting all to anguish and hardship would not much represent the will of a benevolent God, but here it must because . . . God willed all of it.

Perhaps the government gets the blame because it represents man and the militants obtain praise because they can only be acting on behalf of the will of God.

No mention, so far as I have seen, has been made of arrogance and vanity, both of which arguably have to do with the sense of God working through the expression of the person, which may be something most of us feel in working with piety, engaged with art, breathing through song and poetry our appreciation of life.

In a religious society, the same feeling--that induced and accepted elevation and exhaltation--may be interpreted as God-given and pure.

How that gets around to shooting girls wishing to escape the horror of the scene created on behalf of the imagined beatification of a few young men and a handful, if that, of old ones almost beggars explanation.  However, as regards the willingness of children, 14 and 10, to die for Islam, the statement belies assumptions about childhood across cultures as well as the circular returning to the will of God speaking through the very young. 

The good secularist might say quite simply, "the imam trained them for this," and he would not be wrong.

For those who will the following of unreconstructed religious scripts--fundamentalists--there's the generally hoped for Armageddon--who would not want to be a part of that great happening?  And here it is in the Asia Times Online:

"For the al-Qaeda leadership sitting in the tribal areas, the situation is fast evolving into the promised battle of Khorasan. This includes parts of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan from where the Prophet Mohammed promised the "end of time" battle would start." [4]

Political leader and writers share this much at least: the weight of cultural, political, personal, and social beliefs and interests bears down on them.  I do not envy President Pervez Musharraf his plate but rather admire his fortitude, patience, and love in this drama.

Musharraf has taken no hostages at gun point (in fact, to those who surrendered, or, really brought themselves over to police, he provided amnesty, money, and a safe return to their homes).

Musharraf's troops, disciplined, equipped, and present in number, have refrained for days from directly assaulting the mosque in order to spare the lives of the noncombatant participants in it (that, without question, is truly the government's fault).

If Allah determines all, Allah has determined Musharraf's position as well as that of those who have brought AK-47 submachine guns into the sanctuary intended for devotion, education, and prayer.

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1. Overhead view of Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa taken from an army helicopter on Sunday.  Dawn.com, July 8, 2007.

2. Dasgupta, Sanjay.  "Profile: Abdul Rashid Ghazi."  BBC News, July 7, 2007, 2218 GMT.

3. Hasan, Syed Shoaib.  "Anguish of Pakistan mosque parents."  BBC News, July 4, 2007, 1825 GMT.

4. Shahzad, Syed Saleem.  "A moment of truth for Pakistan."  Asia Times Online, July 10, 2007 (is it somebody's Tuesday already?).

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Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim

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Red Mosque: Micro-topology: 070709-0830 Islamabad

Post Start: 070708-2320H EDT; Updated: 070709-0030H EDT

PESHAWAR, July 7: Expressing concern over the deteriorating law and order situation in North Waziristan, NWFP Governor Ali Mohammad Jan Aurakzai on Saturday asked the tribal elders to expel foreign elements from the agency.

“Time is running out. If you don’t take right decisions at this crucial juncture, you would face very tough time in the days to come,” he warned the elders.

“You must expel foreign militants from the agency,” the governor said, adding that a lasting peace in the agency could not be maintained unless these elements were rooted out. [1]

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QUETTA, July 7: Border security officials on Saturday arrested a suspected militant in Sambaza area of the Zhob district and claimed to have recovered over three dozen bombs from him. [2]

The above quote posted from Quetta in Pakistan's English web site Dawn.com comprises about one-third of the story.  I was tempted to roll through similar "teasers" but will spare you (and Dawn and myself) that.

Back up a couple of days: "Gunmen kill four policeman" (Peshawar, July 5); "Missiles fired on army base in Landi Kotal" (Landi Kotal, July 5). 

The manner of reporting at Dawn.com: quite similar to what I found at Shabelle.net out of Somalia--short, factual pieces with not a lot of investigation beneath them.  Still, it's the day to week to month litany of violance that tells the story.

This Sunday evening (eastern standard time), Monday morning (Islamabad time) story follows from the recital of bombs and other munitions recovered, policemen murdered, and warnings (in one direction or another) given. 

The bare and repeated facts from the Red Mosque:

• 50 to 60 fighters intent on implementing Sharia Law in Islamabad, and among them known and wanted Al Qaeda militants;
• Hundreds, and the lowest I believe I've read has been 300 and the highest 1,800, of, one may say, noncombatant persons of uncertain volition kept with the fighters;
• One of two of the leading clerics of the mosque remains in the compound, the other having been caught escaping in a woman's burkha;
• On the part of the government: final warnings have been given to surrender without condition or face death;
• On the part of the cleric now representing the militants: surrender has been offered, but only without arrest: otherwise--martyrdom.

Most of what passes for fighting on the part of guerrilla-style fighters elsewhere involves car, roadside, and suicide bombs, death squad roundups, assassinations, sniper fire, and, now and then, skirmishes with uniformed service forces.  By comparison, the stand-off at the Red Mosque resembles violent student protests everywhere for any cause of the day: sympathetic demonstrators, a few rock throwers, the takeover of a building.  In this update on that familiar formula, the rocks have turned into Kalashnikovs and other serious weapons, and the takeover of the building has come by way of invitation from its administrators.

The prizing and quest for authenticity in spiritual matters--the "be it" and "feel it" factors in religious affiliation and practice--has been addressed in dozens of ways across the campuses of free societies, but in this struggle, the one way is the way prescribed by a cleric in agreement with men with guns.

It's now about 9 a.m., Monday, July 9, 2007 in Islamabad.  Here's a portion of the latest from Dawn.com, still dated on Sunday:

"In a surprise move late on Sunday night, the security forces closed the camp office of the Rawalpindi-Islamabad Press Club situated a few yards away from the ‘no-go area’ within the curfew zone. They also asked journalists to leave the area." [3]

That's not a good sign.

And I do believe here, even with large bombs slaughtering hundreds in and around Baghdad, that the whole world is watching this small but telling drama.

With the article by Syed Irfan Raza, quoted above [3], the details on fighters shooting students to keep them from surrendering to the army have become more clear.  Raza quotes Interior Secretary Syed Kamal Shah as saying, "militants had made all students, including girls, hostage and injured three girls by firing on their legs when they tried to escape." [3]

Dawn.com's latest has Qari Hanif Jallundri, a senior official of the main Pakistani organisation overseeing seminaries, seeking last minute compromises from both sides to avoid an assault on the compound.  That news is relayed in short paragraphs on a page devoted to breaking news, the address for which is this today: http://www.dawn.com/2007/07/09/welcome.htm.

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1. "Tribes urged to expel foreigners."  Dawn.com, July 8, 2007.

2. "Three dozen bombs seized in Zhob."  Dawn.com, July 7, 2007.

3. Raza, Syed Irfan.  "Commander's killing raises spectre of all-out assault."  Dawn.com, July 8, 2007.

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Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim

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