American policy hasn't changed: no negotiations with terrorists.
Afghanistan's policy has changed, at least it seems so, but in the same direction familiar to Americans, Germans, Israelis and others: after negotiating to spare the life of Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo by serving up five prisoners requested by the Taliban, President Karzai's government accepted near de facto the slaughter of two Afghani citizens held with the journalist, the subsequent disappearance of two of the released prisoners, the appearance in Pakistan of another again involved in anti-government politics, and the ascension by near inheritance of another to a commander's post in southern Afghanistan, leaving just one who was made a casualty of war in the past spring's combat.
The state has since reversed the course that makes kidnapping a certain and valuable tool of Taliban war.
From a spiritual perspective, the Taliban who war against corruption and idolatry in regard to money have only to negotiate for the return of their own from prison or, possibly, negate the values both of kinship and of Koran by negotiating instead for money.
While the Korean government supports a military presence engaged in other than combat in the country, it's still Taliban enemy by dint of being the friend of the Taliban's enemies, and, of course, it has no claim on prisoners held by the Karzai government.
This is the absurdity of two players sitting down to poker with empty pockets (if they can even find a table, much less cards and chips).
With British sailors in its brig, time provided Iran with a way to test the onset of World War III in a conventional way and then to wheedle out of it by making a gift of the return of the prisoners while flexing its Revolutionary Guard muscle for the information enshrouded hometown crowd--no harm done, really: Iran has been getting the war it has wanted by proxy (given so many reports of arms of its manufacture showing up in the various theaters).
In Afghanistan, by comparison, the longer the Taliban hold the Koreans, the harder it may be to either abandon them, because of the message that may send, or martyr them, because of the message that will certainly send as regards killing, especially the women (and need one add "who are not one's own").
I've been romantic here and suggested there may even be a hint of human attachment, dare one say love, in the keeping that becomes as much the prisoner's as it is the jailer's.
Discretion a week or so agao may have been the better part of Taliban valor, but where neither discretion nor valor remain available, what then?
I've heard it remarked that the ever cynical and intellectually spry Mark Twain looked out into the dark night late in life and saw nothing there other than the cold universe.
This entire episode recalls that looking perhaps too far and too long into the depths.
1. "We Exchange Opinions with Taliban." Dong-A Ilbo. August 9, 2007.
Correspondence and Permissions: James S. Oppenheim
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