The public relations and the numbers will certainly go back and forth, but for guerrillas against forces far larger than themselves, the tit-for-tat always turns out tit-for-zap.
Guerrilla movement work best in hit-and-run mode, also "beneath the radar" and "invisible." An army that cannot see its enemy cannot kill its enemy.
However, slip into the transition from a guerrilla confrontation to a conventional scenario--then watch out for the attack helicopters, the tanks, and the troops that however young and questionable nonethleless keep arriving in numbers greater than one's own.
We live in the age of "tactical nuclear arms", but we have seen none yet used, and thank God for that: the response to hegemony in conventional war has been clandestine war, hidden war, and small war--guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Whatever the Turkish losses in this latest incursion into northern Iraq, the PKK rebels lose their numbers, and with near autonomous statehood and trade, those "troops" are hard to replace.
So far in the Islamic Small Wars, as I call them, volunteer enthusiasm has been dim to nonexistant.
Hezbollah vs. Israel: Lebanon, much less the Arab world at large, found no cause to rise to the occasion.
Fatah al-Islam vs. Lebanon: neither Lebanon, nor any other entity in the area, found cause to rise to that occasion either, not even the much marginalized camp Palistinians of Nahr al-Bared, whose defenses against an imaginary Israeli invasion were in fact overrun and put to use by an Islamist invasion and subsequently destroyed--and this representing the homes of some 31,000 or so residents--by the state's general warfare against the invasion farce.
Mogadishu, Somalia saw six months to a year's worth of Islamic Courts rule, and it disappeared within weeks of a combined Federal government and Ethiopian Army offensive.
Today, quite able to continue the business of lobbing grenades into theaters, killing teenagers for watching, say, the World Cup championship on television, and assassinating public officials when they answer the door to their homes, it too has failed to garner the support of The People, much less so any of the "war lords" who have other troubles on their minds, not the least of which may have to do with finding their way out of the horror they themselves have brought to their country.
Sometimes in history, the fireworks of war--the battles and bombs, raids and public death marches, hangings, and beheadings--turn out the expression of the end of affairs that were over before they began.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban survived merely weeks in the face of the U.S. invasion, and although it persists . . . it's ill-prepared for running bus lines and hospitals, hotels and factories. It had its chance, even beheading the criminal by Shari'a standards in Kabul's stadium, and yet The People did not join with it. This is not to suggest the Karzai government has turned out all that wonderful for its people but rather to note the disparity between what's in an actor's head and what's really going on in the audience's heart.
The PKK is about the Kurds, not Islam, but it shares with extremist Islam the romance of unicultural sovereignty, an ideal more difficult to achieve everywhere in the world, even in Kosovo from a Serbian standpoint, than it has ever been.
We are universally bound by electronic signals plus the common adoption virtually worldwide of English. For exception, China perphaps stands as sentinel, but Burma certainly, and look at what that junta has had to do to remain in power.
The world wants peace.
Some part of It will have to get over their old clannish, tribal, racist psychology, but I think the world will have its peace--and prosperity--one stable nation and one failed romantic counterrevolution at a time.
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1. "Turkish army says rebel death toll in N. Iraq at 112." Reuters AlertNet, February 24, 2008.
2. "Tactical Nuclear Weapon." Wikipedia, as experienced February 24, 2008.
Correspondence: James S. Oppenheim